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How can we tell from a memory report whether a memory is episodic or not? Vividness
is required by many definitions, whereas detailedness, memory specificity, and narrative
text type are competing definitions of episodicity used in research. We explored their
correlations with vividness in personally significant autobiographical memories to pro-
vide evidence to support their relative claim to define episodic memories. In addition, we
explored differences between different memory types and text types as well as between
memories with different valences. We asked a lifespan sample (N =168) of 8-, 12-, 16-, 20-,
40-, and 65-year-olds of both genders (N =27, 29, 27, 27, 28, 30) to provide brief oral life
narratives. These were segmented into thematic memory units. Detailedness of person,
place, and time did not correlate with each other or either vividness, memory specificity,
or narrative text type. Narrative text type, in contrast, correlated both with vividness and
memory specificity, suggesting narrative text type as a good criterion of episodicity. Emo-
tionality turned out to be an even better predictor of vividness. Also, differences between
narrative, chronicle, and argument text types and between specific versus more extended
and atemporal memories were explored as well as differences between positive, negative,
ambivalent, neutral, contamination, and redemption memory reports. It is concluded that
temporal sequentiality is a central characteristic of episodic autobiographical memories.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the textual quality of memory reports should be taken
more seriously, and that evaluation and interpretation are inherent aspects of personally
significant memories.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, episodic memory, narrative, vividness, memory specificity, redemption
sequence, autobiographical reasoning, life story
INTRODUCTION
We first sketch the conceptual commonalities and divergences
between these three concepts: episodic memory, autobiographi-
cal memory, and narrative. From this we derive the principal aim
of the study, i.e., to explore the feasibility of some defining prop-
erties of the concept of episodic memories by way of testing their
intercorrelation, using vividness as an undisputed characteristic of
episodicity. Then two additional aims of the study are introduced,
namely to explore narrative and other text types and of specific
compared to other memory types, as well as to explore differences
between memory reports of different evaluative qualities.
Tulving (1972) initially introduced the term episodic mem-
ory to separate the domain of traditional memory research on
learning of meaningless verbal material, from the emerging field
of semantic models of knowledge representation. Episodic mem-
ories thus referred to the pairing of contiguous stimuli learned
in a one-time experience in the laboratory. Later when Tulving
(1983, 1985) moved on to study neurologically impaired patients,
he radically shifted the reference of the term episodic memory
to include not just the knowledge of something one has learned,
but also the remembering of the when and where of learning,
and to events of one’s life. Tulving stressed the temporal nature
of remembering both in terms of a sense of personal past as
well as of the temporal structure of what is being remembered,
i.e., the unfolding of an event. At the same time he tied the
remembering of past experiences to a specific phenomenal quality,
autonoetic consciousness. He defined it as an immediate awareness
that the remembered episode has been personally experienced.
Other authors use the term “recollective experience” for remem-
bering personal experiences (e.g., Conway, 2009). Because Tulving
observed in a neurological patient K. C. that his total retrograde
and anterograde amnesia was accompanied by an inability to imag-
ine future actions and scenarios, he expanded the term autonoetic
consciousness to include imagining the personal future. Thus the
term defines the experience of having an extended existence in
time, or a sense of personal continuity (for a narrative critique
of this claim see Habermas and Köber, in press). Wheeler et al.
(1997) further specified that the episodic memory system enabled
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individuals to relive past experiences and imagine living through
future events. They specified that episodic memory produced the
subjective experience of an event, thereby tying episodic mem-
ory to the ability to differentiate one’s own subjective perspective
from those of others. Remembering from a subjective perspective
entails a subjective visual perspective as well as memory of first
person experiences such as perceptions, emotions, thoughts, and
intentions. Thus at this point the term episodic memory came to
include not only remembering, but also imagining hypothetical or
future event sequences, deemphasizing the criterion of veridicality.
How can the episodic quality of a memory be judged objectively
from a verbal memory report? In an influential paper, Levine et al.
(2002) measured the episodic versus semantic quality of verbal
reports of autobiographical memories by counting the number of
clauses providing information about events, time, place, percep-
tions, and thoughts and emotions as well as global ratings of the
maximum detailedness of the reports. A weakness of these mea-
sures is that they strongly depend on the length of the memory
report, although the global ratings of detailedness, which were
also used, do so to a far lesser degree.
A second tradition of memory research evolved in parallel
to the concept of episodic memory. Neisser (1982) pleaded for
expanding the scope of memory research to memories of personal
experiences from one’s life. The term autobiographical memory
(Robinson, 1986) was used for personal memories that are related
to the development of the self. This could be seen in the reminis-
cence bump (Rubin et al., 1986), i.e., an oversampling of memories
from adolescence and young adulthood in adults over age 40,
which was related to adolescent identity development (Fitzgerald,
1988). Neisser (1986) suggested that autobiographical memory
has a hierarchical, nested structure. Barsalou (1988) found that
besides specific events taking place at a specific date autobiograph-
ical memory reports may also contain recurrent (“summarized”)
events and extended events that cover several days or weeks, such
as a trip, both termed “generalized events.” In Conway’s (1990)
hierarchical model of the structure of autobiographical memory
event specific knowledge is nested in generalized events, which are
nested in extended time lines covering longer periods of life, which
in turn are integrated by the life story schema (Bluck and Haber-
mas, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). The autobiographical memory
system is closely tied to mental representations of the self (Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Thus autobiographical memory covers both autobiographical
knowledge as well as autobiographical memories of varying tem-
poral extension. In this terminology, specific events or specific
memories overlap with Tulving’s later understanding of episodic
memories, although the memory of a specific event such as a birth-
day party may either just be known or actually be remembered as
a sequence of perceived events, i.e., an episodic memory. Parts of
this tradition stress the temporal specificity and limited extension
of an event more than a sense of reliving or of personal continuity
(for exceptions see, e.g., Conway, 2009). The measure of episodic
versus semantic quality of autobiographical memories suggested
by Kopelman et al. (1989) is closer to this tradition, as the episodic-
ity of a memory is rated on a four-point scale ranging from specific
events with temporal and locational details to no response or an
answer based on knowledge.
A third, linguistic tradition may also contribute to an under-
standing of remembering past experiences, since these are com-
municated in language. This tradition categorizes types of texts
according to their function and form. Narrative is a text type
which serves to communicate an event by imitating the sequence
of events, typically in sentences beginning “and then . . ., and then
. . ., and then.” Labov and Waletzky (1967) suggest that narra-
tive clauses are at least two sequential main clauses, the referential
meaning of which would change if their order was reversed. For
instance, the clauses“John was hungry. John had dinner at the local
restaurant” change meaning if their order was reversed. Instead
of John going to the restaurant to appease his hunger, the sen-
tences would then imply that the restaurant served portions too
small to satisfy John’s hunger. Labov and Waletzky point out that
narrative texts have a second main function besides imitating an
event sequence, namely that of evaluating the events. Evaluations
are always made from a specific perspective, either by one of the
participants of the event or from without, e.g., by the narrator.
All mental expressions referring to a subjective point of view
including all comments and interpretations by the narrator or
any other individual are termed evaluations. Accordingly, narra-
tive texts comprise not only narrative clauses, but also other kinds
of clauses. When the narrator evaluates a past event by expressing
an emotion, explaining or contextualizing the event, this is done
in non-narrative clauses. Other text types that may be used in the
context of remembering are chronicles (Linde, 1993) that summa-
rize temporally structured events without imitating the sequence
of events, and arguments that explain or justify statements (Rosen-
thal, 1995). If a text contains at least two narrative clauses, the text
is considered a narrative (Labov and Waletzky, 1967), even though
it typically also contains clauses with chronicles, arguments, and
descriptions.
Episodic memories are most adequately communicated in nar-
rative form, because specific episodes are temporally structured
events. Reliving an event implies following the sequence of events.
Actually narrating an event renders it easier to relive an episode
than merely imagining it, because the narrative format requires
a temporal and causal ordering of events. Narrative clauses, use
of the protagonist’s subjective perceptual perspective, and means
of dramatic narrating such as historic present and direct speech
facilitate a reliving for both narrator and listener (Nelson et al.,
2008; Habermas and Diel, 2010). The use of emotion words is
not necessary for a vivid narrative, as emotions are most directly
elicited by the event sequence itself.
Comparing the narrative format to episodic memories, narra-
tives need not be limited to a short duration or precise location,
nor need they be told from the narrator’s past perspective, but
may also be narrated from someone else’s or an objective, outside
perspective. Also, although specific memories tend to be narrated
and narratives tend to concern specific memories, these need not
be narrated, but may be summarized. On the other hand, also
extended events can be narrated, although usually there is a highly
specific event at the core of a narrative, a complicating event.
In this paper we argue that the narrative format appears to best
describe the textual form of reports of the subjective experience
of remembering and reliving an event. We suggest that narrative is
the textual form of reports of all subjective experiences covered by
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Tulving’s term autonoetic experience, which characterizes episodic
memory. Similar to Tulving’s definition, we deemphasize the role
of details, which are important to measure the degree of veridical-
ity of a memory. Instead we focus on the episodic, i.e., story-like
nature of episodic memories which differentiates them from mere
knowledge. Therefore a narrative approach agrees with Tulving
that some non-autobiographical memories and experiences are
to be included in the definition of episodic memories, such as
memories of fictional stories. In this sense, as in everyday lan-
guage use (episodic) memories are such irrespective of whether
they regard personal experiences (autobiographical) or fictional
stories, whether they are true or not.
Possible arguments for conceptually grouping episodic auto-
biographical memories with episodic memories of fictional or
reported stories and with the experiences of daydreaming and
anticipating future scenarios may be that all of these phenom-
ena are simultaneously affected by a specific neurological damage,
or that they activate the same brain regions, or similarities in
the quality of subjective experience (Tulving, 2002). However, we
argue that the subjective experience of reliving corresponds to a
specific format, which is needed to communicate this experience,
i.e., narrative. Under ideal conditions that minimize the probabil-
ity of distortions, a narrative communication reflects a subjective
experience of remembering or imaginatively living through an
event. The narrative format of a verbal report obtained under
ideal conditions is the best way to objectively judge the episodicity
of memories and experiences. If this was true, the narrative qual-
ity of memory reports should correlate with another symptom of
reliving, namely the vividness of a report.
In our study we set out to provide this evidence, comparing
the empirical relation between vividness and aspects of the three
definitions of remembering of personal experiences. We study
these in the most personally significant memories possible, i.e.,
the ones included in life narratives. Therefore in adults these auto-
biographical memories are also most likely to be contextualized in
the narrator’s life to elaborate their biographical significance. This
process of “autobiographical reasoning” (Habermas and Bluck,
2000; Habermas, 2011) is more than mere remembering of past
experiences, and has been discarded as “external detail” in research
on episodic memory (Levine et al., 2002). It is the essential way
of processing autobiographical memories by tying them to other
parts of life and to the development of the self. Thus life narra-
tives contain both autobiographical memories and their evaluative,
interpretative elaboration.
Whereas in earlier analyses (Habermas and de Silveira, 2008)
we were interested in the global coherence of life narratives, here
we segmented life narratives into thematic units comparable to
memories to render comparison to research on isolated episodic
memories easier. We then coded each segment separately for text
type and memory specificity, and we rated detailedness of indica-
tions of time, place, and persons as approximations of the three
definitions of remembering events from the personal past. We
also rated vividness as an aspect that can be related to all three
approaches.
The main aim of this study was to test how some of the sug-
gested aspects of episodic autobiographical memories are related
to vividness as a relatively undisputed characteristic of episodic
memories. We assume that suggested aspects of episodic mem-
ories need to be correlated to vividness and other aspects that
define episodic memories if they are to be accepted as defining
or typical aspects. Thus if suggested criteria of the episodicity of
memories fail to correlate with vividness and with other criteria,
we suggest discarding them as defining elements of the episodicity
of memories. Our expectation was that out of the three charac-
teristics of personal memories, narrative is the best predictor of
vividness because it establishes a gradual unfolding of the past
sequence of events. This expectation is supported by the observa-
tion that when asked to tell familiar fairy tales, the aforementioned
amnesic patient K. C. was able to name a relatively normal number
of themes present in the tales, but failed to establish the correct
order of these themes, offering disorganized, discoherent accounts
(Rosenbaum et al., 2009). This does not point to a lack of either
(semantic) knowledge or of memories of specific events as rep-
resented by the themes, but specifically to a lack of the ability
to provide narrative structure to events. Finally, we expected the
evaluation of past events in terms of emotions, interpretation, and
integration of the event into the life story to be less related to
vividness.
A second aim of the study was to explore differences between
narrative and other text types and between specific and other kinds
of memories. Given the current focus on episodic autobiograph-
ical memories, there is little research on other than specific types
of memories and other than narrative types of text. Memories
of recurrent events, for example, are relatively frequent in auto-
biographical accounts. In contrast to specific memories which
tend to focus on the exceptional (Bruner, 1990), memories of
repeated events may serve to underline the typical and habitual.
For instance, when talking about one’s childhood, sentences begin-
ning with “We used to . . .” provide a sense of what it was like back
then. A recent comparison of memory types evidenced that mem-
ories of recurrent events served more social functions, whereas
specific and extended memories serve more self and directive func-
tions (Waters et al., 2013). We expected both specific memories and
narrative texts to be the most vivid and most detailed categories,
chronicles and generalized event memories next, and arguments
and memories of extended periods and comments last.
A third aim of the study was to explore differences between
memory reports of differing valence. Negative events tend to be
narrated more fully (Habermas et al., 2009b). Also, avoidance of
specific memories and preference of repeated or extended events
is typical for depressed individuals who may wish not to confront
the specifics of negative events (Williams et al., 2007), which again
suggests that specific memories are more negative than generalized
memories or memories of entire periods.
We were interested not only in comparing positive with negative
memories, but also in memories of mixed valence and especially
in memories in which there is a change of valence. McAdams
(2006) termed episodes in which valence shifts from bad to good
redemption sequences, and episodes in which good turns bad
contamination sequences. Redemption sequences are related to
resilience, contamination sequences to depression (Lilgendahl and
McAdams, 2011). The inclusion of sequences of changing valence
pays tribute to the temporally sequential nature of (memory) nar-
ratives, which canonically start with a (positive or neutral) normal
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state of affairs, then present a problem or complication, followed
by attempts to solve it and a positive or negative outcome. Thus
memories, especially if they are remembered sequentially like in
a narrative, supporting reliving, are not always homogenous in
valence. Rather complications usually provoke negative evalua-
tions and emotions, while the final result may be a happy or not
so happy end (cf. Habermas and Berger, 2011). We were interested
in exploring differences between events of homogeneous and of
mixed valence. This interest results from taking seriously the tem-
porally sequential nature of episodic autobiographical memories,
which is part of Tulving’s later definition of episodic memory, but
often not considered empirically.
Our data set had originally been collected to answer develop-
mental questions. The four younger age groups have been used
to study the development of global coherence in life narratives
(Habermas and de Silveira, 2008; Habermas et al., 2009a). Some
of the ratings and codings presented here have been used in a
developmental analysis of the lifespan development of episodic
memory and autobiographical reasoning (Habermas et al., in
press). In this paper we do not pursue developmental interests.
Rather, the extant age range of the participants serves to ensure
that results can be generalized across almost the entire life span.
The only age-related limitation is that autobiographical reasoning,
reflected in the code life story integration, increases across adoles-
cence (Habermas and de Silveira, 2008), and that the amount of
detail and length of memory reports increase slightly between ages
8 and 16 (Willoughby et al., 2012) also in this sample.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 168 females and males from a central German city was
distributed across six age groups (8, 12, 16, 20, 40, 65 years) with
mean ages of 8.57 years (SD= 0.28, 14 girls, 13 boys), 12.38 (0.36,
14, and 15), 16.61 (0.43, 14, and 13), 20.52 (0.53, 13, and 14), 40.79
(2.87, 14, and 14), and 64.53 (2.27, 15, and 15). The youngest age
group was the higher achieving half of third graders from a grade
school, the adolescent and young adult groups were students of a
Gymnasium, leading up to an“Abitur”which allows entry into uni-
versity. Participants for the two oldest age groups were recruited
with flyers distributed widely in local shops, at sports facilities,
doctors’ offices, and among continuing education University stu-
dents. The younger age groups were heading toward an “Abitur,”
whereas 24 of the middle-aged and 19 of the older adults had
“Abitur” or “Fachabitur,” and 4 and 9 respectively had finished
school after 10 years, with 2 of the older adults with a lower or no
school degree. In the middle-aged group 14 held a College degree,
17 in the oldest group. Thus the four younger age groups were well-
educated, and the educational level of the two older age groups was
also well above average. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants and from the parents of participants younger than
18 years.
PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS
The three younger age groups were interviewed individually by one
of five different trained female interviewers in their mid-twenties
in their schools, the three older age groups in our lab. Participants
wrote seven most important memories from their lives each on a
card, dated them, and put them in sequence on the table. Then
they narrated their life in 15 min, integrating the seven memories
and explaining how they have become the person they are today
(cf. Habermas and de Silveira, 2008, for verbatim instructions).
Participants were not interrupted except for a reminder of the
time left after 10 min, and otherwise only encouraged to continue
non-verbally. The seven memories served to ensure that specific
episodes were integrated into the life story.
Segmenting
Verbatim transcripts were created from audio-files. They were
divided into thematic segments containing at least four clauses
(Diel et al., 2007). The prototype of a segment is a narrative
focusing on a specific, datable event. Ideally segments are explic-
itly introduced and ended. Two research assistants independently
segmented 16 entire life narratives κ= 0.82. Then each coder seg-
mented half of the remaining narratives. To check the quality of
the ensuing segmenting, another randomly chosen 16 narratives
were coded also by the respective other coder, yielding K = 0.92.
A deviation of a segment border of up to one clause was tolerated.
Coding
Segments served as basic units for coding, each segment receiv-
ing a code or rating (Diel et al., 2009). Ratings were made on
scales ranging from 0 to 3 following Levine et al. (2002). Each
point was defined in a manual. In the Appendix we present three
examples of segments with their codes and ratings to illustrative
purposes. For each participant, mean ratings and relative frequen-
cies of codes were used. To measure interrater reliability, we used
single intraclass correlations for ratings and Cohen’s Kappa for
nominal codes.
Detailedness of person, place, and time. Three aspects of the
detailedness of information regarding persons, place, and time
were rated. Person detail received a 3 if an individual was depicted
very graphically with at least three details, a 2 if an individual was
described with at least one additional information, a 1 if an indi-
vidual was named, and a 0 if no or only anonymous people were
mentioned. Place detail received a 3 if the location was precisely
determined, e.g., by naming a specific building, a 2 if a location
was named without allowing the identification of a precise place
(e.g., the name of a long street), a 1 if only a generic place or a town
was named, and a 0 if no location was named. Temporal detail was
rated with a 3 if a date was provided, a 2 if a at least a year was
provided, a 1 if the temporal indications were relatively imprecise,
and a 0 if no temporal information was included that would allow
a listener to roughly know when the event had taken place. Two
raters independently rated person detail in 16 entire life narratives
(261 segments), r ic= 0.83. Then one of the two rated the remain-
ing narratives. To check again the quality of the ensuing coding,
another eight of these remaining narratives (140 segments) were
rated also by the other rater, yielding r ic= 0.80. Intraclass cor-
relation for place detail was r ic= 0.86 (0.82) and for time detail
r ic= 0.84 (0.87).
Vividness and emotions. For vividness, a value of 3 was given if
the overall impression was very vivid and the segment included a
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dramatized narration of a specific event, a 2 if the segment was
fairly vivid and contained intensifiers like “very” and global evalu-
ations like “it was just great,” a 1 if the segment was not vivid and at
the most one emotion label, global evaluation, or intensifier, and
a 0 if the segment appeared dry and monotonous. Interrater relia-
bilities were r ic= 0.82 (0.81). For emotions, 3 was rated if several
emotions were named and at least one emotion was described in
detail, a 2 if several emotions were only named, but not further
specified, or if one emotion was named and elaborated, a 1 if one
emotion was named, and a 0 if no emotion was named. Interrater
reliabilities were r ic= 0.85 (0.84) based on 261 (140) segments.
Text type andmemory type. We coded two typologies of memory
reports: memory specificity was taken from memory psychology
and text type taken from linguistics. Although specificity aims at
the content, text type at the form of text, they still should be highly
related, because if specific events are talked about at length, they
tend to be narrated. Following Barsalou (1988), we coded seg-
ments either as containing a specific memory of an event lasting
up to a day, as generalized event, i.e., repeated events or events
extending between a day and a year, as a period lasting longer
than a year [approximating Conway’s (1990) “lifetime period”],
or as a segment that does not refer to a temporal unit, such as a
comment. Interrater reliabilities were κ= 0.81 (0.71) based on 261
(140) segments.
Additionally, segments were coded as a narrative text if it
contained at least two consecutive narrative clauses referring to
consecutive events (Labov and Waletzky, 1967), as a chronicle, if
it was not coded as narrative and the main bulk of the segment
summarized events (Linde, 1993), or as an argument, if it was
not coded as a narrative and the main part of the segment con-
tained evaluations or interpretations (Rosenthal, 1995). Interrater
reliabilities were κ= 0.83 (0.79) based on 250 (140) segments.
Life story integration and interpretation. We rated the degree
to which the segment was related to other parts of the life story
and the degree to which it was interpreted. Life story integration
was rated 3 if the segment contained at least three references to
other times or to other topics in life, 2 for two, 1 for one, and 0 for
none such reference. Interpretation was rated 3 if the significance
of the segment for one’s life, a change in personality, or a pro-
found change of attitude was described, 2 if the narrator described
her or his own personality, explained emotional reactions, or gave
a meaning to the event, 1 if an event was evaluated positively
or negatively or emotions were mentioned, and 0 if events were
only factually narrated, but not evaluated. Life story integration
achieved an interrater reliability of r ic= 0.81 (0.31), interpretation
of r ic= 0.82 (0.60), based on 337 (140) segments.
Valence. We coded the overall valence of the segment with six
categories: neutral, ambivalent, positive, negative, initially nega-
tive turns out well (redemption sequence), and initially good turns
bad (contamination sequence; McAdams, 2006). Interrater relia-
bilities were κ= 0.80 (0.75) based on 250 (140) segments. We also
constructed a continuous variable of valence (used in Table 1),
assigning −2 to contamination,−1 to negative valence, 0 to neu-
tral and ambivalent segments, 1 to positive segments, and 2 to
redemption sequences.
Age of memory. The age of each segment was judged in terms of
age at the beginning and age at the end of the period covered by
the segment, which were then averaged. Interrater reliabilities were
r ic= 0.94 (0.95) for the averaged values used here, based on 15 life
narratives with 249 segments (5 life narratives, 88 segments).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics at the level of individuals use ANOVAs. Since
we are interested in relations between different aspects of life nar-
rative segments, we analyze at the level of segments. In addition,
because a varying number of several segments belongs to the same
life narrative by the same narrator (n= 3075, N = 168), segments
are not independent measurements. Therefore we mostly pro-
vide measures of the magnitude of differences or correlations. To
provide some information about probabilities, we will aggregate
Table 1 | Correlations between aspects of memory reports (N =3075 segments, upper right triangle) and means of correlations within
participants (N =168 participants, lower left triangle; significant correlations in bold).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Vividness 0.13 −0.04 0.00 0.03 0.28 0.49 0.38 0.18 −0.01 −0.15 0.46
2 Detail of person 0.11 0.07 0.02 −0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.17 −0.04 −0.01 0.20
3 Detail of place 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.02 −0.06 −0.07 0.08 0.03 0.22 0.13
4 Detail of date −0.04 0.03 0.08 −0.02 −0.07 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.07
5 Specific memory −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.30 0.07 0.00 −0.05 −0.04 −0.06 0.06
6 Narrative text 0.28 0.08 0.02 −0.08 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.02 −0.06 −0.10 0.31
7 Emotion 0.60 0.07 −0.03 −0.02 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.13 −0.05 −0.09 0.31
8 Interpretation 0.45 0.03 −0.04 −0.02 0.04 0.07 0.32 0.18 0.02 −0.02 0.32
9 Life story integr. 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.18 −0.04 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.35
10 Valence 0.01 −0.04 0.08 0.03 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 0.01 0.05 −0.06 −0.05
11 Age of memory −0.13 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.17 −0.03 −0.13 −0.08 −0.02 −0.05 −0.02
12 Segment length 0.52 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.08 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.38 −0.03 −0.11
Only for mean correlations within participants (lower left triangle): p<0.05 if r>0.15, p<0.01 if r>0.19, p<0.001 if r>0.27.
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correlations for each individual to test hypothesis 1. We will com-
ment on correlations not under 0.15 and effect sizes indicating
a prediction of variance of not below 2%. The corresponding
correlation of 0.15 marks the lower limit of half of all correla-
tions considered in a large set of meta-analytic studies (Hemphill,
2003). This lower limit also acknowledges that variables with only
two to four points tend to result in relatively low correlations.
This approach is tuned to the object of interest, i.e., qualities of
segments measured repeatedly in varying numbers for each indi-
vidual. It is also in line with the more exploratory nature of the
study as well as with the recent stress on magnitude of effects rather
than their probability.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Life narratives consisted of a mean of 241 propositions
(SD= 103.20) and 18.31 segments (SD= 6.90). Segments con-
tained a mean of 13.37 propositions (SD= 3.57). In ANOVAs
with age group and gender as factors, length of life narratives
both in terms of overall number of propositions [F(5, 156)= 9.94,
p= 0.000,η2= 0.24] and number of segments [F(5, 156)= 10.13,
p= 0.000, η2= 0.25] significantly varied with age, as did, to a
lesser degree, mean number of propositions per segment [F(5,
156)= 2.71, p= 0.022,η2= 0.08]. Increase in length of entire nar-
ratives and of segments was linear with age, with the exception of
the 40-year-olds for life narrative length and an exception of the
65-year-olds for segment length. There were no overall gender
differences.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF EPISODICITY
To explore the relation between possible indicators of episodic-
ity, we calculated all correlations on the basis of all segments
(N = 3075; Table 1, upper right triangle). To enable us to test
the significance of correlations and of differences between them,
we also calculated all correlations within individuals, then trans-
formed them to Fisher’s z-values, and then averaged them across
individuals (Table 1, lower left triangle). Among the correlations
between aspects of memory reports which have been proposed as
aspects of the episodicity of memories, i.e., the first six aspects in
Table 1, there was an expected correlation between narrative and
memory specificity (r = 0.29) and between narrative and vividness
(r = 0.28). All the other correlations between the first six variables
are negligible. Thus the measures of detailedness of persons, place,
and time correlated neither with each other nor with vividness,
narrativity, or memory specificity. To compare correlations with
vividness, we calculated t -tests for dependent correlations. Nar-
rativity indeed correlated significantly more with vividness than
memory specificity, t (134)= 2.97, p < 0.01 and also more than
detailedness, t (158)= 1.98, p < 0.05.
Segment length correlated most with vividness, and also, to a
lesser degree, with narrativity, emotionality, interpretation, and life
story integration. Related aspects correlated with each other, such
as vividness and emotionality, and interpretation and life story
integration. Unexpectedly, interpretation correlated strongly with
vividness, and, to a lesser degree, with emotionality. Separate cor-
relations for the three pairs of adjoining age groups revealed the
same pattern of correlations. Only correlations with life story inte-
gration were larger in older age groups, due to the near absence
of life story integration in lower age groups (cf. Habermas and de
Silveira, 2008; Habermas et al., in press).
For descriptive purposes, we also ran a principal components
analysis with correlations between all segments. Two components
resulted from a screen test, explaining 22.2 and 13.1% of vari-
ance respectively. After varimax rotation the first component had
loadings of 0.79 for vividness, 0.77 length, 0.64 emotion, 0.55 inter-
pretation,0.46 life story integration,and 0.40 narrative text format.
Component 2 had loadings of 0.53 for life story integration, 0.50
for detail of place, 0.48 for temporal detail, −0.44 for narrativity
and −0.41 for specificity, and 0.40 for age of memory. All other
loadings were below 0.3. The first component may be interpreted
to assemble characteristics of the episodicity of the verbal report,
with a surprising, though low loading of life story integration. The
second component may be interpreted to represent aspects of ver-
bal reports that help locate events in life, in time, in space, which
plausibly appears to be more necessary for older memories.
CONCURRENT PREDICTION OF VIVIDNESS AS PROXY FOR EPISODICITY
Taking vividness as the most uncontroversial proxy for episod-
icity of a memory report among the variables coded here, we
explored the simultaneous correlations of possible indicators of
episodicity on vividness. To this end we ran three stepwise regres-
sions on vividness, entering all variables that explain more than
1% of variance to explore the variables’ relative contributions in
predicting vividness (N = 3075 segments). First we used only the
five possible indicators of episodicity. Narrative text format pre-
dicted 7.9% of variance (β= 0.28), person detail added another
1.4% (corrected R2= 0.091, ∆R2= 0.014, β= 0.12). However,
when segment length was added, it predicted 21.5% of variance
(β= 0.46), reducing the contribution of narrative text to 2% (cor-
rected R2= 0.235, ∆R2= 0.020, β= 0.15). Entering all variables
in a third regression analysis left this contribution of narrative
text intact: emotionality (corrected R2= 0.242,β= 0.49), segment
length (corrected R2= 0.350, ∆R2= 0.108, β= 0.35), interpreta-
tion (corrected R2= 0.383,∆R2= 0.034, β= 0.20), and narrative
text (corrected R2= 0.406,∆R2= 0.023, β= 0.16). Out of the five
suggested indicators of episodicity, narrative text format is still the
best predictor of vividness even when used concurrently with seg-
ment length and all other variables to predict vividness. However,
the effect size of narrative text format is reduced substantially by
adding segment length from 8% to only 2%.
The unexpected correlation between vividness and interpreta-
tion might have to do with the way we operationalized interpreta-
tion: a 1 had been assigned if an emotion was not just transported
by the plot, but was actually put in words and named. This is a very
basic way of interpreting lived experience and does not carry with
it the cognitive and distancing flavor stronger interpretation does.
Also this definition of a rating of 1 for interpretation is similar to
how a 1 for emotion was assigned. This explanation of the corre-
lation between vividness and interpretation was confirmed when
comparing mean vividness ratings for segments with interpreta-
tion values of 0, 1, and 2 or 3: while an interpretation rating of 0
was low in vividness (M = 0.77, SD= 0.63), there was no differ-
ence in vividness between an interpretation rating of 1 (M = 1.68,
SD= 0.73) and 2 or 3 (M = 1.66, SD= 0.78). Accordingly sepa-
rate correlations between vividness and a dichotomous variable
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with a 1 for a 1 in interpretation and a 0 for all other interpreta-
tion ratings was higher (r = 0.28) than between vividness and a
dichotomous variable with a 0 for interpretation ratings below 2
and a 1 for interpretation ratings of 2 or 3 (r = 0.18). The reverse
pattern showed for correlations of the two dichotomous inter-
pretation variables with life story integration (r = 0.16). Thus the
correlation between vividness and interpretation is driven by the
naming of emotions, but not by stronger forms of interpretation.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TEXT TYPES AND MEMORY TYPES
We explored differences between text types and memory types,
focusing on narratives and specific memories as the types that
come closest to specific episodic autobiographical memories. Out
of a total of 3075 segments, 34.8% were narratives, 33.1% chron-
icles, and the remaining 32.1% arguments. Regarding memory
types, 17.4% were specific memories, 49.7% extended events last-
ing more than a day and up to a year, 19.7% periods lasting
over a year, and 13.2% atemporal comments (Table 2). Of the
specific memories 66.3% were narrations, and 33.1% of narra-
tives regarded a specific memory. Thus most specific memories
tend to be narrated, but narratives may also cover longer time
stretches.
Text type explained more variance of ratings and length than
did memory type (Table 3). Most notably, text type explained 8%
of variance in length of segment and 6% of variance in vividness.
Narrative was the longest and most vivid text type. Memory type,
in contrast, only explained 4% of variance of detailedness of per-
sons. Comments were most detailed regarding persons, apparently
regarding comments on enduring aspects of individuals. Although
on average specific memories were the longest and the most vivid
segments, these differences did not account for more than 0.5 and
0.3% of variance respectively. It is interesting to note that both
in terms of text type and memory type, detailedness tended to
be greatest in segments summarizing events and covering long
stretches of time or repeated events. Thus detailedness in terms of
person, place, and time was not a characteristic of narrative nor
specific memories.
VALENCE: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SEGMENTS, REDEMPTION, AND
CONTAMINATION SEQUENCES
Finally we explored whether events of differing valence also dif-
fered in other respects. All segments were coded for valence, with
40.4% positive segments, 23.0% negative, 13.2% ambivalent, and
8.8% neutral, and with 10.0% redemption sequences in which an
initially negative state turned out well, and 4.6% contamination
sequences in which an initially positive state turned out negative.
Segment valence explains the most variance in ratings and
length (Table 3) regarding vividness (7%), emotion (5%), and
length of segment (4%), and to a lesser degree, also some variance
of interpretation and life story integration (2%). The general trend
with all these aspects is that redemption, then contamination and
ambivalent segments are longest, most vivid and emotional, and
also most interpreted and linked to other parts of life, followed
by negative, then positive, and finally neutral segments. Thus seg-
ments in which there is a sequence of actions with a change of
fortune are, not surprisingly, the most vivid and emotional texts,
followed by texts with more stationary mixed emotions.
Table 2 | Crosstabulation of text type with memory types.
Text type Memory type – event
Specific Generalized Long Comment Total
Narrative 354 494 124 97 1069
16.8 −2.8 −8.3 −4.9
Chronicle 94 565 268 91 1018
−8.2 4.5 6.5 −4.9
Argument 86 470 215 217 988
−8.7 −1.6 1.9 9.9
Total 534 1529 607 405 3075
Rows in italics indicate corrected residuals per cell.
With regard to the contingencies of valence with text type and
memory type (Table 4), negative segments were most frequently
narrated as expected, redemption sequences were more often nar-
ratives or chronicles, and contamination sequences were most
often chronicles, followed by narratives. A similar, but less pro-
nounced pattern showed in memory types. Negative segments
were most frequently found in specific memories, redemption
sequences in specific and extended memories, and contamination
sequences in extended events.
DISCUSSION
SUMMARY
Evaluation and narrative text format characterize episodic
autobiographical memories
Comparing various characteristics of episodic autobiographical
memories, vividness, emotion naming, and narrative text type cor-
related most with each other. Neither memory type nor detailed-
ness of person, place, or time covaried with vividness as the most
uncontroversial indicator of the episodicity of a memory, nor did
indicators of detailedness correlate with each other. Detailedness
is thus not a correlate of remembering an episode, i.e., a sequence
of related actions and events. Static memories of what one’s child-
hood home looked like or of one’s parents’ characters may be
quite detailed without referring to events. Actually detailedness
of persons was highest in comments, which apparently contained
reflections on a person or relationship. Detailedness of place and
time were highest in memory reports covering long life periods
and in chronicles, suggesting that not so much memories of very
specific events but rather summary reports of long stretches of
life, like one’s time in elementary school, require detailed local and
temporal background information.
Apparently specific memories (limited to 1 day) are not espe-
cially vivid either. Rather it seems to be the sequential way in which
events are presented in the text by narrating, and not just sum-
marizing them, which contributes most to the vividness of the
memory report. This finding supports the notion that episodic
memories at the level of experiencing involve the reliving of an
event, which implies most importantly imagining the events in
a temporal forward fashion. Temporal sequentiality is one of the
two constitutive aspects of narrative. While Tulving’s concept of
episodic memories focuses on the subjective experiential level,
and narrative focuses on objective textual aspects of memories,
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Table 3 |Text types, memory types, and valence (means, standard deviations in italics, effect sizes).
Vividness Detailedness Life story integration Interpretation Emotion Text length
Person Place Time
Total 1.44 1.21 0.91 1.11 0.65 1.11 0.56 13.20
0.82 0.78 0.72 0.91 0.73 0.91 0.86 8.59
TEXTTYPE
Narrative 1.75 1.25 0.95 1.02 0.62 1.11 0.71 16.9
0.87 0.71 0.67 0.91 0.74 0.87 0.95 10.5
Chronicle 1.27 1.19 1.06 1.29 0.77 1.07 0.49 12.0
0.75 0.79 0.71 0.87 0.77 0.93 0.81 6.8
Argument 1.26 1.19 0.75 1.02 0.54 1.14 0.47 10.5
0.73 0.84 0.71 0.93 0.65 0.92 0.80 6.3
η2 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08
MEMORYTYPE
Specific 1.49 1.17 0.92 1.07 0.57 1.09 0.69 14.4
0.85 0.65 0.70 1.00 0.68 0.84 0.92 9.4
Generalized 1.46 1.14 0.91 1.10 0.61 1.10 0.54 12.9
0.80 0.76 0.68 0.90 0.72 0.92 0.85 8.4
Long period 1.38 1.20 1.10 1.31 0.80 1.14 0.49 13.4
0.85 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.94 0.82 8.6
Comment 1.38 1.57 0.72 0.90 0.67 1.08 0.56 12.5
0.81 0.88 0.74 0.96 0.74 0.92 0.86 8.3
η2 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
IMPLICIT VALENCE
Neutral 0.81 1.15 1.00 1.23 0.50 0.69 0.14 9.7
0.74 0.81 0.78 0.97 0.65 0.91 0.47 5.5
Positive 1.41 1.18 0.94 1.14 0.60 1.11 0.44 12.0
0.78 0.78 0.71 0.92 0.71 0.91 0.74 7.2
Negative 1.52 1.24 0.90 0.98 0.61 1.12 0.69 13.8
0.83 0.76 0.69 0.89 0.72 0.87 0.94 9.1
Ambivalence 1.56 1.32 0.88 1.17 0.75 1.23 0.68 15.6
0.80 0.78 0.69 0.90 0.77 0.92 −0.93 9.9
Redemption 1.65 1.17 0.94 1.13 0.85 1.25 0.82 15.5
0.83 0.74 0.70 0.90 0.75 0.95 1.01 10.0
Contamination 1.59 1.25 0.84 1.03 0.80 1.09 0.74 15.4
0.75 0.82 0.66 0.83 0.79 0.77 0.99 10.2
η2 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04
both share temporal sequentiality as the core element. However,
in memory research this temporally sequential aspect of memo-
ries is rarely studied, but mostly inferred once participants state
that they remember an event, or it is judged from verbal memory
reports, i.e., narratives.
The explicit and communicative nature of a narrative sup-
ports following a temporal sequence, whereas tacit remembering
requires less temporal order. More probably tacit remembering
involves thinking of specific situations, images, or impressions,
which in remembering need not be brought into a sequential
order. Thus it could well be that it is the narrative text for-
mat that more strongly induces a sequential reliving than mere
remembering does. This would imply that the sequential aspect of
reliving depends less on the memory system, save in some cases
like traumatic memories (Rubin et al., 2008), but on the manifest
linguistic shaping of the memory.
Aspects of the second constituent of narrative, the evaluation of
the events, contributed even more to vividness. There are varying
degrees of distancing involved in evaluation. Internal evaluations
(Labov and Waletzky, 1967) arise from within the storyline and are
made from the points of view of the past protagonists, while exter-
nal evaluations are by others and from more distanced temporal
perspectives. In our study, the naming of emotions substantially
correlated with vividness, as did, to a lesser degree, interpreta-
tion. For the latter, the more distanced forms of interpreting did
not add to vividness over and above the mere naming of emo-
tions. The most distanced form of interpretation, integrating the
remembered event into the life story, still correlated positively, if
more moderately with vividness.
Finally the mere length of a memory report correlated not
only with vividness, but also with emotion, narrativity, interpre-
tation, and life story integration. Thus the length of a memory
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Table 4 | Crosstabulation of evaluative patterns with text and memory
types.
Evaluative pattern Memory type – event
Specific Generalized Long Comment
Neutral 38 98 75 60
−1.5 −4.7 3.4 4.6
Positive 188 606 258 190
−2.7 −0.9 1.2 2.9
Negative 181 367 103 57
6.6 1.3 −4.0 −4.6
Ambivalent 45 209 88 64
−3.6 0.8 1.1 1.7
Redemption 65 167 54 20
1.9 1.8 −1.0 −3.6
Contamination 17 82 29 14
−1.7 2.0 0.2 −1.2
Sum 534 1529 607 405
Text type
Narrative Chronicle Argument Sum
Neutral 61 70 140 271
−4.4 −2.7 7.2
Positive 367 418 457 1242
−5.0 0.5 4.6
Negative 318 181 209 708
6.5 −4.9 −1.7
Ambivalent 135 144 127 406
−0.7 1.1 −0.4
Redemption 134 135 37 306
3.5 4.3 −7.9
Contamination 54 70 18 142
0.8 4.2 −5.1
Sum 1069 1018 988 3075
Rows in italics indicate corrected residuals per cell.
report seems to be driven by several of these aspects. Taking into
account segment length substantially reduced the predictive value
of narrative text, without altering its position relative to the other
suggested attributes of episodicity. However, length in and of itself
is not a variable of primary interest here, but depends on how
much an event is narrated and how much it is evaluated. There-
fore the prediction of vividness without using segment length
reflects the relative influences of text qualities of interest more
adequately.
To sum up, as expected narrativity was a stronger predictor
of vividness than memory specificity and detailedness. In addi-
tion, basic levels of evaluation, i.e., naming emotions, contributed
even more to vividness. The comparably small size of the effect
of narrative text might be related to the dichotomous coding of
narrativity. A rating of the degree of narrativity of memory reports
would capture this aspect better and could very well increase its
predictive power.
Exploration of types of memory reports
The typologies of memory reports revealed some interesting dif-
ferences, more between text types and less between memory
types. First, as expected narratives were more vivid than chron-
icles and arguments, whereas differences between memory types
were minimal. Similarly, narratives were longer than chronicles
and arguments, whereas the same trend was weaker for specific
memories.
Text types also differed more than memory types with regard to
evaluative patterns. As expected, negative events were dispropor-
tionately more frequent in specific and narrative memory reports.
Redemption sequences were distributed equally across narratives
and chronicles as well as specific and generalized events, whereas
contaminations sequences were most frequent among chronicles
and generalized events. This confirms that negative events tend to
motivate more specific and more narrative memory reports than
positive or neutral events. In terms of memory and text type, neg-
ative memories stuck out. However, memory reports with mixed
evaluations, and especially those with a change of fortune stood
out in terms of being the most vivid and emotional, the longest,
but also the ones that were most often interpreted and integrated
into the life story. Again this points to the importance of a nar-
rative structure of memory reports, since narratives normatively
contain changes of fortune as events unfold and actions fail or
succeed.
LIMITATIONS
The autobiographical memories analyzed in this study were
selected as highly self-defining, covered participants’ entire lives,
and were narrated by participants from a very wide age range.
Therefore they may not be quite comparable to most of the more
recent, less self-relevant memories from mostly young adults used
in most research on episodic memory. However for example the
tendency to produce specific or non-specific memories seems to
be comparable when cued with words or asked to narrate self-
defining memories (Sumner et al., 2013). In addition, the more
personal nature and more diverse age ranges of both memories
and participants should render results more relevant for various
ages and personally salient autobiographical memories.
The study was correlational. This appears to be adequate if the
object of interest is relationships and not causal effects. Memories
were not explicitly elicited as memories, but were chunks of con-
tinuous life narratives. Thus some parts of life narratives may be
produced less with the intention of providing memories but to fol-
low the life line and fill in gaps between memories. Although this
probably leads to the production of more non-specific memories
than instructions to remember specific episodes, we would argue
that regarding autobiographical memory this method provides
a broader range of elements of autobiographical remembering
more representative of the whole range of ways of autobiographi-
cal remembering. In more narrow and controlled studies, specific
kinds of episodic memories might be elicited to explore whether
defining characteristics are more characteristic under some recall
conditions than others. For instance, going beyond the scope of
this paper which was limited to autobiographical episodic mem-
ories, future studies might compare autobiographical with other
kinds of episodic memories such as memories of routine activities,
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dreams, daydreams, stories known from hearsay, and fictional
stories as well as fantasized future scenarios in order to explore
whether the autobiographical quality of memories sets them apart
from other episodic memories in terms of the defining qualities of
interest here.
Only four suggested criteria for the episodicity of memory
reports were tested here. Future explorations of the episodicity
of memories should also include other aspects of memory reports
such as the perspective of mental references, the actual number of
narrative clauses, or the completeness of the narrative structure, as
well as subjective reports of a sense of remembering vs. knowing,
of experiencing that the episode had been personally lived through
before, and the intensity of a sense of reliving.
A more serious limitation was the partial semantic overlap
between some constructs. This had not been intended when writ-
ing the manuals, but sometimes a more operational definition
relying on specific indicators proved necessary to achieve the nec-
essary interrater reliability. Specifically there was some overlap
between emotion naming and the ratings of vividness and of inter-
pretation. For the mid-range ratings of vividness emotion labels
could be one indicator out of several possible. For a rating of 1
in interpretation the presence of emotion labels was sufficient.
Although theoretically these definitions do make sense, ideally
these two ratings would be defined without operational overlap.
Finally participants were well-educated. This may have increased
attempts to interpret memories and to integrate them into the life
story.
IMPLICATIONS
Not detail, but temporal sequence makes autobiographical
memories episodic
The degree of detail in terms of specifications of individuals, place,
and time are not essential elements of episodic autobiographi-
cal memories. The importance of detail in the memory literature
probably stems from memory research’s focus on the veridicality
of memory, and the field of episodic memory appears to be slowly
shifting away from detailedness (Piolino et al., 2009). For many
practical purposes, remembering detail is important, such as when
witnessing a crime. Also when remembering important episodes of
one’s life veridicality is still a prime issue, since interlocutors do not
want to be confronted with an invented life. However it is less the
details of an event, but rather the event sequence itself, its causal-
motivational internal structure and its meaning that matter. The
precise geographical and temporal location is less important than
what happened, who did what, why, and with what consequences,
and what it tells about the narrator.
Both the temporal sequentiality and a structuring through
intentional acts are implied by the choice of the term episode,
which denotes a relatively self-contained part of a larger story.
Temporal sequentiality is also implied by Tulving’s definition of
episodic memories as a reliving of experiences. Also the specificity
of memories implies a temporal sequentiality, since it requires
events with a temporal extension. But the limitation of the dura-
tion of specific memories to 1 day is somewhat arbitrary and
reflects a too strong focus on detailedness. The centrality of
temporal sequentiality for episodic autobiographical memories
suggests that identifying the episodicity of memories objectively
in memory reports should rely more on the event character of
episodic memories than on atemporal details and dating.
Also, when studying the affective valence of memories, measur-
ing only positive versus negative tone and affective intensity may
miss important differences. Memories with conflicting evaluations
and or even with a change of fortune, and especially memories of
negative events with a happy ending, stand out as especially long,
vivid, and emotional as well as involving more interpretation and
integration into the life story. Memory reports differ both by the
specific emotions involved as well as by the sequence of emotions
(Habermas et al., 2009b) and sequence of positive versus negative
evaluations (McAdams, 2006).
This insight has consequences for the study of memory in psy-
chopathological states. Thus in depression memories tend not only
to be less specific (Williams et al., 2007), but they also differ in their
temporal structure. This not only means that in depression mem-
ories have less of an internal temporal extension, but also that a
change from a positive to a negative evaluation in episodic mem-
ories is more frequent (Adler et al., 2006). In addition, depressed
patents are more immersed in their past, as shows in a less linear
temporal structure of life narratives and less stepping outside past
episodes to comment on them (Habermas et al., 2008).
The textual quality of episodic memories is narrative
In a way important autobiographical memories require being nar-
rated to oneself as well as to others. If a memory is really relived or,
for that case, intensively experienced like a daydream, the events
are visually and linguistically narrated to oneself. The normative
form of narrative (Labov and Waletzky, 1967) requires not only a
temporal ordering of events, but also their causal-motivational
structuring so as to understand what happened. Thus a fully
episodic autobiographical memory is more than the memory of a
specific scene, but requires an interpreted sequence of events and
actions.
This is in accordance with an understanding of the ability to
remember as being culturally socialized (Nelson and Fivush, 2004;
Habermas et al., 2010; Fivush et al., 2011) and of memories as being
culturally framed, put into and formed by text, and communicated
in language (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011). Thus more atten-
tion should be paid to the actual textual and narrative qualities of
autobiographical memories. Here we used a rating and global cod-
ing methodology which is more typical for memory research than
for linguistic analyses. We have demonstrated narrative analyses
of the textual surface of autobiographical memories of a more dif-
ferentiated linguistic kind elsewhere (e.g., Habermas et al., 2009b),
which might well increase the correlation of narrativity measures
with vividness.
Autobiographical episodic memories are not only relived and
narrated, they are also evaluated
There are varying degrees of the immediacy of evaluating, ranging
from more affective to more cognitive modes, from perceptions to
emotions and thoughts in the past to those from a present or hypo-
thetical perspective, from immediate reactions to more effortful
and complex interpretative efforts. This dimension implies varying
degrees of narrative distancing from the past event. Past percep-
tions and past direct speech are very close to past experiences
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(Habermas et al., 2008). Also the naming of emotions is relatively
close to past events and therefore correlates highly with vividness.
Complex form of evaluation such as interpretation and auto-
biographical reasoning are more distanced forms of evaluation.
Autobiographical reasoning establishes logical links between a past
event and other, distant parts of life or with the narrator’s person-
ality and its development (Habermas and Bluck, 2000; Habermas,
2011). What we termed life story integration here, the mere men-
tioning of other parts of life or of personality, is a simple measure
of autobiographical reasoning. Autobiographical reasoning goes
beyond mere remembering by establishing the meaning of the
past event for who the remembering person was and is. The abil-
ity for creating coherent life narratives and for autobiographical
reasoning, i.e., a specifically biographical view on events, develops
between late childhood and early adulthood, as was demonstrated
in two studies (Bohn and Berntsen, 2008; Habermas and de Sil-
veira, 2008). First studies of the location of brain activities corre-
lated with autobiographical reasoning have also been undertaken
(D’Argembeau et al., 2008, in press). In this study, interpretation
and autobiographical reasoning were related to changes of fortune
in the memory and to its vividness and emotionality.
Episodic memories of biographically non-salient events do not
evoke much of an interpretation or autobiographical reasoning,
which therefore can be ignored without a great loss. However the
more potentially personally significant a past event is, the more
autobiographical reasoning becomes part of the process of remem-
bering, and the more it should be included in studies of episodic
autobiographical memories.
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APPENDIX
MALE PARTICIPANT, 8 YEARS, TOTAL OF SIX SEGMENTS, SEGMENT 6
“FLEA MARKET”
“Now I have to think what else. There was a flea market now.
That was very exciting. That was fun. I sold some stuff.”
Ratings: vividness 2, detailedness – person 0, place 1, time
2, specific memory, chronicle, emotion 3, interpretation 1, life
story integration 0, valence 1, 0 months old memory, 5 propo-
sitions.
MALE PARTICIPANT, 20 YEARS, TOTAL OF 22 SEGMENTS, SEGMENT 21
“FATHER DOESN’T KNOW EVERYTHING”
“But already in 7th grade I started asking questions, which
my father couldn’t give an answer to, and then it was “I don’t
know it”. But then I was thinking by myself,“Why, why doesn’t
he know it?” I mean, that’s when I first noticed, that my father
doesn’t know everything, that he is also only human, that he
is a real normal person. Before then it was always like, my
Dad is my big role model.”
Ratings: vividness 3, detailedness – person 2, place 0, time 1,
extended memory, narrative, emotion 0, interpretation 2, life
story integration 1, valence 2, 103 months old memory, 13
propositions.
FEMALE PARTICIPANT, 60 YEARS, 37 SEGMENTS, SEGMENT 24 “FATHER
REMARRIES”
“That year my father married for a second time. And that was
quite incisive because he totally focussed on his new wife and
family, such that I – had done my part, and we have no con-
tact till today. I can’t accept letting myself be hurt anymore.
It was like, he was like totally changed, as if what I did, didn’t
count for anything anymore, I had passed my youth, my early
adulthood, when other women start a family of their own, I
spent that time with my father. Therefore for me it was like
he gave me a kick. We had been very close, almost like a cou-
ple without sex. We had even been addressed as husband and
wife. And then he just remarried, very fast after my mother
had died, which I could not understand. But well, that’s the
way it went.”
Ratings:, vividness 2, detailedness – person 1, place 0, time
1, specific memory, argument, emotion 2, interpretation 2, life
story integration 2, valence −1, 326 months old memory, 21
propositions.
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